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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

MADSONIA REALTY CO~fp ANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.ZION'S SAV1NGS BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, a corporation, as executor of the Estate of Richard vV.
~fadsen, deceased, and LaReta C.
l\fadsen,
Defenda!nts awd Appellants.

Case No. 7589

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AXD APPELLANTS
STATE~IENT

OF FACTS
In the course of the probation of the estate of R. W.
Madsen, the plaintiff in this action, l\1adsonia Realty
Company, a corporation, filed a petition for an order
directing the executor to execute a deed to certain property known as 667 East 1st South Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and also described in the petition as follows:
''Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot
1, Block 60, Plat 'B', Salt Lake City Survey, and
running thence North 160 feet: thence \Vest 99
feet; thence South 160 feet; thence East 99 feet
to the place of beginning.''
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The petitioner alleged that "on or about the 1st day
of January, 1937, R. W. ~Iadsen sold to petitioner, Madsonia Realty Company,'' the aforesaid land. Madsonia
further alleged that no formal deed was ever executed
and delivered by said R. W. :Madsen to l\Iadsonia Realty
Company, but there was an agreed price of Ten Thousand
Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($10,680.00), which was
paid by said Madsonia Realty Company to R. W. :Madsen; that at the time of said sale R. W. Madsen was
president of :Madsonia Realty Company, and was its
general manager, and said R. W. Madsen also kept the
account books of said corporation; that as of January
1, 1937, said R. W. :Madsen, as general manager of said
corporation and as the bookkeeper thereof, made a record
of sale by entering the same on the journal and ledger
account of said corporation; that no actual cash or money
was delivered to said R. W. Madsen, but his account was
credited in the amount of said purchase price and the
property was thereby paid for in full. (R. 3, 4)
Petitioner prayed that the Court direct the executor
to execute a deed to petitioner to the aforesaid property.
(R. 5) Subsequently the defendant LaReta C. Madsen
filed a demurrer and ans,wer to this petition, and an
answer was filed in behalf of the executor. The Court
thereupon directed that the matter be transferred from
the Probate to the Civil Division of the court, and that
the matter be tried as a civil suit against the estate of
Mr. Madsen. (R. 1)
The real property involved was the home of R. W.
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Madsen and his first '"ife. He inherited it from his
mother and it was considered the family homestead.
Richard 'V. :J[adsen and LaReta C. Madsen were
married on October 30, 1935, and they continued to be
husband and wife until the time of the death of R. W.
:Madsen on ~lay 17, 1948. (R. 71)
L€tters testamentary were issued to Zion's Savings
Bank and Trust Company, as the executor of the Last
Will and Testament of R. W. l\Iadsen, and at the time of
the hearing this bank was acting as the executor. (R. 71)
The Court found that R. W. l\Iadsen was the sole owner
of the premises at the time of the marriage to LaReta
C. l\{adsen, and that on the 1st day of January, 1937, he
''by oral agreement sold to :petitioner, Madsonia Realty
Company, the property described . . . for the purchase
price of Ten Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars
($10,680.00); that R. W. Madsen evidenced such sale by
entering the same on the books of Madsonia Realty Company in his own handwriting, he being the president, general manager and bookkeeper of said company." (R. 71)
T·he Court found that he received the full consideration
but failed to execute or deliver a deed to the property. (R.
71) The court found that between January 31, 1937, and
June 6, 1946, the corporation collected all of the rents,
paid all of the taxes and paid for the upkeep :and repair .
of the property. (R. 71, 72)
The Court further found: "That on the 6th day of
June, 1946, said property was sold to James 0. Peterson
and C. Amelia Peterson, his wife, for the price of Sixteen
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Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00) ; that said
eontract of sale was evidenced by an instrument in writhis wife, as buyers, and R. W. Madsen and LaReta C.
ing signed by James 0. Peterson and C. Amelia Peterson,
~Iadsen, as sellers; that said R. W. Madsen was in fa:ct
acting for and on behalf of Madsonia Realty Company
in the signing of said contract of sale; thatR. W. Madsen
entered the sale of said property on the books of Madsonia Realty Company and credited said buyers on the
books of Madsonia Re·alty Company with $4,000.00, being
the down payment on said contract." (R. 72) The contract provides for monthly payments of $125.00, and
the Court found that at the time of the death of R. W.
Madsen there was a principal balance owing in the
amount of Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Dollars
and eleven cents ($10,730.11). (R. 72) All of the money
paid by the Petersons under the contract went to Madsonia. None of it was kept by Mr. Madsen personally.
(R.. 72, 73)
The Court found: "That neither at the time of the
execution of the Peterson contract on or about June 6,
1946, nor at any time prior thereto, did the defendant
LaReta C. ::Madsen know that Madsonia Realty Company

ili:

[:

~~

t~!

I

had or claimed any right, title or interest in or to the
aforesaid property; that at no time did R. W. :Madsen
personally, or did any other agent, officer or employee
of Madsonia Realty Company, take any step whatsoever
-to put LraReta C. Madsen on notice of any claim or interest by the said corporation.'' (R. 74)
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At the ti1ne of the bookkeeping entry on January
1, 1937, LaReta C. ~ladsen did not promise or ag-ree to
make any conveyance to the corporation or anyone else.
In fact, she did not eYen know of th~ book entry or of
any alleged transaction between R. vV. Madsen and the
corporation. At the time of the execution of the Peterson
contract, neither :Jirs. :Madsen nor ~f r. Madsen received
any consideration. The Court found that the sole consideration and pay1nent went to the corporation, and that
R. W. Madsen was simply acting as the trustee or in
some other fiduciary capacity to the corporation in executing the contract.
The Court found that l\1.rs. Madsen signed the Peterson contract for the purpose of releasing her statutory
distributive share pursuant to Section 101-3-4 of the
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and that she did in fact release her dower interest. (R. 73)
R. W. Madsen left a Last Will and Testament which
was admitted to probate and the Court found that ''LaReta C. Madsen has elected to take under S'aid Will and
does not renounce the provisions thereof in her favor.''
(R. 73) The Court also found "that by electing to accept the provisions of the said will, said LaReta C.
Madsen is not estopped and barred from claiming an
interest in the p-roperty hereinabove described by n~aso~1
of statutory dower or otherwise. (R. 73)
The provision of the will is as follows:
'' 5. Th:Iindful that there is secured, to my said
wife by the laws of Utah, one-third ofmyreal esSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tate in said State, if she survive me as my lawful
wife, and that she will receive such one-third by
the operations of the law and not under the terms
of this will, I therefore make no provision in her
favor respecting said one-third being conducted
with the provisions of the State of Utah in her
behalf and willing that she receive said one-third
by the operation of law and not under the terms
of this Will. The other and remaining two-thirds
of my real estate in the said State of Utah, I give,
devise and bequeath to R. W. Madsen, Jr., and
Francis A. :\fadsen, in equal shares." (R. 29)
In a codicil, ~:Ir. Madsen reiterated the idea that his
wife should receive one-third by operation of law, but
in addition he gave to her expressly the entire ownership of certain real estate at 6974 Holladay Boulevard.
(R. 32, 33)
The executor defended the action on the theory that
there was no writing to satisfy the statute of frauds
(U.C.A., 33-5-1), and no writing subscribed as required
by 33-5-3 of the Utah Code Annotated, and that the
action was barred by applicable statute of limitations
(U.C.A., 104-2-5, 22(2), 23 and 30). nirs. Madsen denied
several of the allegations of the complaint, set up the
statute of frauds and the statute of limitations, and
further in defense and as a counterclaim to the plaintiff,
~irs. Madsen alleged that she received no consideration,
and that if the Peterson contract was executed as alleged
by the plaintiff, then she joined not with her husband but
with a fiduciary for the plaintiff corporation, and that
since neither she nor her husband received any consideration for the Peterson contract, she had never contracted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to convey her statutory share to the Petersons or anyone
else. She alleged, moreover, that her husband owed a
duty to her to disclose to her at the time of the execution
of the Peterson contract the fact that he was acting as
fiduciary for the corporation. She alleged that the corporation kne'v she did not have notice of its interest and
that it did not at any time give her any notice of its
interest, and that the failure to disclose the interests
and the relationships of the corporation to her husband
constituted a fraud upon her. She asked the Court to
require the corporation to account for one-third of all
the sums received under the Peterson contract and onethird of all sums to be paid thereunder. (R. 53-59)
The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to
specific performance of the alleged contract with R. W.
Madsen, and it entered its decree requiring his executor
to execute its deed to plaintiff. ~[adsonia was held to
be entitled to all moneys received and to be relieved
under the Peterson contract, but its request for a decree
against Mrs. :Madsen was refused. Mrs. Madsen was
denied relief as against plaintiff, and her request that
she be awarded dower in the seller's equity was also refused. (R. 75-76, 90-91)

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT NO. I
THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF IS BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
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POINT NO. II
PLAINTIFF PROVED NO COMPLIANCE WITH THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

There was no memorandum reduced to writing.
N10 writimg was subscribed by the parties to be
charged as .required by Section 35-5-3, U.C.A., 1943.
(c) Plaintiff proved insufficient part perforrJUllnce
bo t·ake the case out of the St:atute of Frauds.
(a)
(b)

POINT NO. III
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS SECOND CONCLUSION
OF LAW, WHEREIN IT FOUND "THAT LaRETA C. MADSEN
BY THE SIGNING OF SAID CONTRACT TO JAMES 0.
PETERSON AND C. AMELIA PETERSON, RELEASED
HER STATUTORY DOWER RIGHT AS PROVIDED BY SECTION 101-4-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, AND SHE
HAS NO PRESENT INTEREST IN OR CLAIM UPON SAID
CONTRACT."

(a) Since urnder the theory of plaintiff and the trial
court R. W. M·adsen executed the Peterson contract as
trustee o'f pZa;intiff, the signature of Mrs. Madsen was ineffectual'as a reletase of her ·mower as to any one, including the Petersons, since a wife cannot release inchoate
wowe.r unless joined by her husband.
(b) Even if LaReta C. Madsen agreed to convey
her dower rights to the Petersons, that fact does not
enl.arg.e the rights .of plaintiff.

(c) The seller under am executory contract of sale
of re,al property ret:ains a ''legal or equitable .estate in
.real property." Under our Statute the widow shares i:n
in this interest.

(d) The execution of a contract to sell kMui does not
extinguish the seller's interest inl the land.

POINT NO. IV
THE SILENCE OF R. W. MADSEN, SR., AND THE
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PLAINTIFF, AND THEIR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE
ALLEGED INTEREST OF THE PLAINTIFF IN THE LAND
AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE PETERSON
CONTRACT, CONSTITUTED A FRAUD UPON MRS. MADSEN. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT
TO HER FOR ONE-THIRD OF THE TOTAL SALES PRICE,
AND SUCH RELIEF TO HER SHOULD BE A CONDITION
TO ANY RELIEF TO PLAINTIFF IN THIS ACTION.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF IS BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Secion 104-2-5 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
provides:
"No action for the recovery of real property
or for the possession thereof, shall be maintained
unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor,
grantor or predecessor, was seized of the property
in question within seven years before the comInencement of the action.''
Section 104-2-22 ( 2) provides that ''an action upon
any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in the preceding section" shall be brought within six years.
Section 104-2-23 provides that '• an action upon a
contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an
instrument in writing * * * '' shall be brought wit~in fo~r
years.
Section 104-2-30:
''An action for relief not otherwise provided
for must be comn1erced within four years after the
cause of action ~hall have accrued. ''
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The Court erred in the case at bar in failing to find
that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
In substance and effect the Court found that plaintiff and
defendant R. W. Madsen, Sr., executed a contract for
the conveyance of real property on or about the first day
of ·January, 1937. Conceding for the purpose of argurnent that the book entries relied upon by the plaintiff
were sufficient to evidence the existence of the contract
found by the Court and that the alleged contract is enforceable, it is nevertheless clear that the only c.ontract
rnade at any time between R. W. Madsen, Sr., and plaintiff was made and completed on January 1, 1937. The
Court found in substance that at all times subsequent to
this date R. W. Madsen, Sr., was acting as the agent
and fiduc.iary of the corporation in his dealings with this
land. The only contract ever made between R. W. Madsen
and plaintiff, if indeed there ever was a contract, was
entered into on this date, and the obligation of R. W.
Madsen to perform, according to the terms of the alleged
contract, must date from this time. There is no other time
from which the time for his performance can be measured.

Glltl

itat
lin

There can be no question that the statute of limitations commenced to run against R. W. ~{adsen, Sr., as of
January 1, 1937. Whether the applicable statute is seven
years, six or four under the Utah law is not material,
because the time has passed in any event.
The findings of the Court are barren of any reference to the statute of limitations. The theory upon which
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the Court denied the 1notion of the defendants based on
the statute of limitations is not set out. The Court purports to enforce the contract between the plaintiff and
defendant exeeuted January 1, E)~i7, but fails to indi'cate
in any manner whether the statute was tolled in some
respect or by son1e act of the parties or what other reasons it nray have for enforcing the alleged agreement
at this late date. Clearly the Court erred in failing to
make findings of fact on this important issue.
Plaintiff corporation is confronted with this dilemma: On the one hand, if it is attempting to enforce
a contract entered into on January 1, 1937, this contract
was executed by it entirely on that date and the performance of R. W. Madsen was due at that time, and the
statute of limitations has long since run against its claim.
On the other hand, if it is not attempting to enforce a
contract entered into on this date, there are no findings
and there is no evidence to support a judgment in its
favor against the executor, because clearly no agreement
was made between plaintiff and the deceased at any other
time with respect to this particular piece of real property.
Some argument during the course of the trial was
directed to the idea that plaintiff was attempting to enforce the terms of a trust. Because it is anticipated that
plaintiff might make some argument about trust in its
brief, we desire to lay a firebreak at this time as far as
the statute of limitations question is concerned. The only
way plaintiff can contend that there is a trust is b:v
reason of the fact that R. W. l\iadsen did not perforn1
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under the terms of the alleged contract. The use of
"trust" language is misleading. There is no trust except as it arises by operation of law. The only way the
larw ·can operate is through the establishment of the contract. The trust theory, therefore, is applicable only in
the sense that under plaintiff's theory the deceased owed
an obligation to plaintiff to execute a deed on January
1, 1937, since deceased at that time had legal title to
the property. Certainly Mr. Madsen was not a trustee
in any sense except as he held the title. He had no actual
duties as trustee. There was no trust agreement. If this
is not an action to perform a contract, we challenge the
plaintiff in its brief to tell the Court what the action is
all about. If this is not plaintiff's theory it has certainly
been successful in keeping its theory to itself during the
entire trial and proceedings in this case.
It is sub1nitted that the statute of lin1itations has run
against plaintiff's claim, and hat it cannot successfully
1naintain this action against the executor of R. W. Madsen, Sr., or against his widow.
POINT NO. II
PLAINTIFF PROVED NO COMPLIANCE WITH THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

(a)

There was no memorandum reduced. to writing.

Section 33-5-1 of the Utah Code requires that any
contract for the conveyance of an interest in real property must be reduced to writing. Under the facts of this
case the writing relied upon by the plaintiff to comply
with the statute of frauds is insufficient, both in that it
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does not adequately describe the real property which
was the subject of the alleged contract, and in that it
does not disclose the tenus of the alleged contract.
The evidence relied upon by the plaintiff is a boo~
entry in the books of :Jladsonia Realty Company, in
the handwriting of R. ,V. :Madsen, Sr., as follows:
·'NAME Real Estate - 667 East 1st .So. St.
Date
Items
Fol.
Debits
Jan. 1, 1937
Ground
304
$4120.00
Jan. 1, 1937
Building
304
6560.00"
In connection with this entry there was introduced
evidence of an entry in the account of R. W. :Madsen
crediting him with the sum of $10,680.00 on January 1,
1937. How many inferences can be drawn from these two
book entries~ It is possible to assume that the $10,680.00
was the first payment on the real property and that other
payments were to he forthcoming. If that is the case,
it is absolutely impossible to ascertain the other terms
of the contract. Whether plaintiff was to pay the balance
at a time certain or in monthly installments, or pay interest, is certainly not apparent from these entries. It
is possbile to assume that the amounts shown were to
constitute the entire transaction, and that Mr. Madsen
was obligated immediately to convey his interest in the
property. It is impossible to know whether R. W. Madsen
agreed to convey only his interest or his own plus an
inchoate dower right of :Jirs. :Jiadsen. The terms of any
agreement cannot be ascertained from these book entries.
Any attempt to spell out the agreement results in hazardous speculation and uncertainty.
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The law is well settled that the entire terms of the
bargain Inust be apparent fron1 the writing itself to
satisfy the statute of frauds.
''The general rule is that the memorandum,
in order to satisfy the statute, Inust contain the essential terms of the contract, expressed with such
certainty that they may be understood from the
memorandum itself or some other writing to
which it refers or with which it is connected, without resorting to parol evidence. A memorandum
disclosing merely that a contract has been made,
without showing what the contract is, is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the statute of
frauds that there be a memorandum in writing of
the contract." 49 Am. J ur. 663, 664.
The plaintiff could conceivably contend that these
trwo book entries, in connection with the acts of the parties, disclose the existence of a contract, and that the
subsequent acts of the parties adequately define its terms.
Such a statement would be inaccurate and extreme, but
whether or not it is true is immaterial. The question is
whether there is writing that satisfies the statute of
frauds. That writing itself must contain the terms of
the contract. The subsequent actions of the parties cannot be relied upon to disclose its terms, but that writing
itself must do the job. In the case at bar there is no writing that satisfies the statute.
(b) No writing was su,bscribed by the parties to be
charged as .required by Section 35-5-3, U.C.A., 1943.

The Utah statute of frauds not only requires the
mmnorandum referred to be in writing, but Section 335-3 of the Utah Code requires that the writing be sub-
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scribed by the party to be changed. Under such circmnstanres it is held that the writing rnust be signed at the
end th·ereof by the party.
In Dacis v. Shields, (1841), 26 \Yend. (N.Y.) 341,
reversing (1840) 24 \Vend. 322, a broker inserted the
names of both :parties in n1emorandum, but neither of
the parties nor the broker signed it. The Court held that
because of the change in the language of the New York
statute of frauds by substitution of the word ''subscribed'' for ''signed,'' the n1emorandum was not sufficient to satisfy the statute.
In Jarnes v. Patten, (1851), 6 N.Y. 9, 55 Am. Dec.
376, the defendants' names appeared in the b:ody of the
memorandum which was in the handwriting of one of
the defendants. The Court held that the statute requiring that the memorandun1 be ''subscribed'' required that
it be signed manually at the end of the agreement, and
that the words ''signed'' and ''subscribed'' were not
synonymous or equivalent.
In McGivern v. Fleming, (1884), 12 Daly (N.Y.) 289,
66 How. Pr. 300, the defendant's daughter at his direction signed a mernorandum near the middle, and the
Court held that the memorandum was insufficient both
as to terms before and after the signature. The Court
held that the memorandum was not subscribed. To the
same effect is Bisgeier v. Kellar (1934), 122 Misc. 705,
203 N.Y. Sup. 797, where the defendant wrote his own
name in the middle of the document.
A lease of property for more than one year was re-
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quired to be subscribed and not merely signed in Three
Hundred West Averi!Ue Corporation v. Warner (1929),
250 N.Y. 221, 165 N. E. 271.
The California statute requires a memorandum to
be subscribed. In Re Clifford (1873, C.C.) 2 Sawy. 428,
Fed. Case No. 2893, a federal court held that the printing
of the name or the seller at the head of a written paper
would not satisfy the statute.
In the case at bar there is no writing signed by R.
W. Madsen which evidences an intention to sell to the
corporation. He did not sign any of the book entries and
there can be no question that he did not subscribe any
writing as far as the corporation is concerned. Oertainly
the Court is not justified in concluding that there was
evidence to satisfy Section 35-5-3 of our Code with reference to the purported transaction between R. W. :Jiadsen
and 1\iadsonia.
(c) pz,aintiff proved insufficient part. perfor'I'JW!nCe
to t·ake the case out of the St·atute of Frauds.
The Court made no Conclusion of Law to indicate
whether it felt that the contract between Mr. Madsen and
the corporation was satisfactory under the statute of
frauds, or whether there was sufficient part performance
to take the case out of the statute. Failure to make such
finding is reversib}e error in itself. This is a vital point
of law. The issue was directly raised by answer and motion by both defendants. The Court completely ignored
the contentions in its Findings, Conclusions and Decree.
Inasmuch as the partial perfor1nance idea was pre-
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sented in the course of the arg·ument, and it is not in1possible that the ·Court applied the doctrine in this case,
it is believed that consideration of it as applied to the
facts of this cas,e is worth while.
The doctrine of part performance is only applicable
in those situations where the actions of the party so point
to the existence of a contract with respect to a particular
piece of property which is the subject of that contract
that there can be no doubt of its existence. So fundamental is this principle that no citation of authority is
necessary. The contract itself must be so clear and unmistakable that its terms can be understood and the
rights of the parties to it can be protected by the court.
In the case at bar no such proof was adduced. Plaintiff produced no evidence whatsoever which in any way
sheds any light on th~ question as to whether Mrs. 1\Iadsen 's inchoate dower interest in the property was to be
sold by Mr. Madsen to the corporation under the terms
of his alleged contract with it. There is no ~evidence that
Mr. Madsen received any actual consideration from the
corporation for his interest in the property. The n1ost
the evidence can be said to disclose is that the books of
the company show a credit of $10,680.00.
Plaintiff presented the theory, and the trial court
found, that the plaintiff paid the profits tax upon a profit'
to the corporation of $9,428.41 showed some part per~
formance. This fact 0ertainly does not help plaintiff.
In the first place, plaintiff apparently failed to take advantage of the installm~nt provision of the tax statutes.
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It paid a tax based on an anticipated profit which it may
or may not receive, depending upon fortuitous circumstances oVJer which it had no control. ·These circumstances include the future value of real estate, the possibility of derault by the buyers on the contract and the
collectibility of any judgment against the buyers. In the
second place, it is purely a self-serving, hearsay kind of
action. Even if it has some effect as an admission by
R. W. M:adsen and the interest he owned, it certainly
does not constitute an admission against the interests
of his wife or enlarge the corporation's claim to these
rights.
Attention is invited to the fact that the decree of the
Court has the effect of giving plaintiff the benefit of
the conveyance of the interest of Mrs. ~Iadsen to the
Petersons, even though there is no evidence of any contract whatsoever between ~Irs. Madsen and the corporation. It must be admitted by all parties that no evidence
was produced con0erning any ag.reement of any kinrl
between :Mrs. :Madsen and 1Iadsonia. The Court, in fact,
refuses to enforce such a contract and says that the
corporation cannot obtain specific performance against
her. Despite this holding, the Court directs, in effect,
the Petersons to pay to the corporation all sums which
they agreed to pay to Mr. and Mrs. Madsen. Certainly
under any theory of the case thel"e is no evidence whatsoever of any agreement or part performance by Mrs. Madsen that justifies this conclusion.
POINT NO. III
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS SECOND CONCLUSION
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OF LAW, WHEREIN IT FOUND "THAT LaRETA C. MADSEN
BY THE SIGNING OF SAID CONTRACT TO JAMES 0.
PETERSON AND C. AMELIA PETERSON, RELEASED
HER STATUTORY DOWER RIGHT AS PROVIDED BY SE'CTION 101-4-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, AND SHE
HAS NO PRESENT INTEREST IN OR CLAIM UPON SAID
CONTRACT."

(a) Since wnder the theory of plaintiff and the trial
court R. W. Llla.dsen executed the Peterson :contr,act as
trustee of plai.ntiff, the S'ignat>Ure of JJ!l rs. JJ!l ads en was ineffectual as a release of her ·dJower as t-o any one, induding the Petersons, since a wife cannot release inchoate
dowe.r un~ess joined by her husband.

The Court decided that ~Iadsonia was not entitled
to any relief against LaReta C. Madsen (R. 75; Conclusions of Law Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6), but the Court indicated in Conclusions of Laws Nos. 2 and 3 that Mrs. Madsen has no interest whatsoever in this property. (R. 75)
It is clear the Court finds that Richard W. Madsen signed
the Peters·on contract as a fiduciary of plaintiff corporation. The plaintiff in fact alleges in its petition that
the Peterson sale "·was in fact made by l\tfadsonia
Realty Company,'' and in substance that Richard W.
Madsen ,executed the deed as trustee of the corporation.
The Court adopted this theory in the following language: ''that said Richard W. l\fadsen was in fact acting
for and on behalf of l\1adsonia Realty Company in the
signing of said con tract of sale." (Finding of Fact No.
6; R. 72) The situation therefore is that the Peterson
contract was executed by R. W. :Madsen as trustee of
plaintiff and by :Mrs. LaReta C. :Madsen personally.. It is
a situation where l\1rs. :Madsen, as the wife of the de-
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ceased, joined with plaintiff corporation in the execution
of a contract of sale. No consideration of any kind went
either to Mrs. Madsen or her husband.
The law is setHed that unless a woman receives consideration she cannot release or convey her inchoate
dower interest in land. It is to be noted that at the time
of the execution of the Peterson contract, under the
theory of the plaintiff and trial court the bare legal title
to the property was in Mr. Madsen; the equitable beneicial interest was in the plaintiff corporation, and both
of these interests were subject to the inchoate dower
right of l\Irs. Madsen. The trial court held that the signature of Mr. Madsen was in fact that of the corporation,
and that the corporation's interest was subject to the contract. The question, therefore, is whether a married
woman who receives no consideration can, by joining with
a third person, convey her interest.
There is no question but that a marri,ed woman has
only a contingent inchoate interest in the land owned
by her husband. The cases repeatedly have held that
she has nothing to convey or sell except as an incident
to a conveyance by her husband. Therefore, if the deed is
not with the husband 'and joined by him, or if the deed
of the husband is set aside or annuHed or disregarded
for any reason, and the conveyance is held ineffective as
to his interest, it is also ineffective as to the interest of
his wife ·and her inchoate dower is restored.
Scribner in his work on Dower states the law as
follows (2nd Ed., Vol. 2, Page 313, beginning at Section 49):
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•'A wife who joins with her husband is a conveyance of his lands, is not a party thereto, except
for the purpose of relinquishing her dower. She
is not to be regarded as alienating a real subsisting estate, but as releasing a future contingent
right. Her renuciation of dower is to attend the
conveyance of her husband; to enduDe while that
endures, and no longer. Hence if the conveyance
of the husband be inoperative, or if it be set aside,
or avoided, the right of dower remains unimpaired.
''50. It is upon this principal that dower is
restored where a conveyance in which the wife has
joined, is set aside as fraudulent as to the creditors of the husband, and in a case where lands
were sold on execution, and before the expiration
of the time for redemption, the judgment debtor
and his wife executed a mortgage upon the same
lands, but the premis,es were not redeemed, and
the purchaser received a sheriff's deed, it was
decided that the right of dower was not barred by
the ·execution of the mortgage, because the subsequent mortgage was extinguished by the failure
to redeem from the prior sale. So where the wife
relinquished her dower by joining her husband in
a deed containing the usual covenants; and the
grantee afterwards recovered judgment and sa tis~
faction against the husband for an alleged breach
of his covenants 'that he was lawfully seized and
had good right to conve)~'; it was held that such
deed could not be made use of to bar· the wife from
her dower in the land. 'The estate,' the court said,
'did not pass from Parsons to Hinckley, .as ap-,
pears from his own allegations and proceedings;
and the relinquishment of dower by the wi£e cannot now avail, since there is no estate for it to
operate on. ' So where a widow was administni-:trix of her husband's estate, surrendered her
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dower in part satisfaction of a claim asserted
against the estate, and the settlement was afterwards set aside at the instance of the creditor, it
was held that the right to dower was thereby
reviVted. ''
In Robinson v. Bates, 3lvt:et. (Mass. 1841) a husband
and wife joined in a deed whereby she releas•ed her dower.
A creditor of the husband subsequently levied on the
land during the life of the husband and recovered the
land in an action against the grantee of the deed in
which the wife and husband joined, the creditor's theory
was that the deed of the husband and wife was in fraud
of creditors. The wife thereupon, after the death of the
husband, sued for her dower right in the land and the
judgrnent creditor objected on the ground that she releas•ed her interest in the deed. The Court said:
"In Stinson v. Sumner, 9 Mass. 143, it was
decided that where a wife releases her claim of
dower by joining her husband in a conveyance
and the purchaser recovers back the purchase
money on account of the grantor's defect of title
to the land, the release of the wife the·reby becom•es inoperative and does not bar her right of
dower after her husband's decease. The principal
upon which that decision is founded applies conclusively to the present case. The tenant has
avoided the deed of the husband and defeated the
estate on which the demandment to release the
dower was intended to operate. By law, therefore,
and in justi0e she was thereby restored to her former rights.''
Tiffany in his work on Real Property, 3rd Ed., Vol.
2, Page 384, Sec. 512, thus states the law:
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··In con1n1on law the wido·w could, after the
husband's death, release her dower right, but the
wife of a living husband has no such right. The
only mode in which a married won1an -can convey
or extinguish any interest belonging to her being
by joinder with her husband in a fine or recovery. There are som·e states statutes authorizing the release by the wife of her inchoate dower
and her right to release it by joining in her husband's conveyance generally recognized.
''A release by the wife is usually ineffectiv~e
unless the husband joins therein, sometimes by
express provisions of statute, sometimes by reason of the general rule that a married woman
cannot dispose of interest in land without the joinder of her husband. And the fact that the release is made to one to whom the husband has
previously conveyed the land does not dispense
with the necessity of joinder. If the widow marries again, her second husband must join in her
release of dower rights in her first husband's
land.''
The principal is again recognized and applied in
French v. Peters, 33 Maine 396. There the hushand
executed a mortgage on January 19, 1829. The wife did
not join with her husband but by a separate conveyance
written upon the back of the mortgag~e purported to
convey to the same mortgage on February 4, 1829. She
recited that this is "done by the consent of my said husband, testified by his being a party thereto,'' ·but the
husband was not a party to her ~onveyance. She received
no consideration except the sum of $12,000.00 which had
been paid previously to her husband. The Court held
that she encumbered no interest that had in the. land.
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She could not convey anything except as an incident to
the conv·eyance of her husband. Since the husband had
previously conveyed but he did not join in her conveyance, her supposed deed had no legal force or effect. The
wife recovered her dower inter·est in the land.
And in Fu.lk v. Robinson, 140 Ark. 12, 215 S. W.
67 4, the Court stated the question to be: ''Whether ·or not
a wife can convey her inchoate right of dower and homestead to a stranger by executing a deed in which her
husband does not join.'' The Court answered in the
negative.
In P·age v. Page, 6 Cushings Rep. 196 (Mass.), subsequently to the execution of a deed by her husband a
1narried woman executed a document which purported
to relinquish her dower in the land previously conveyed.
Held, since the wife did not join with her husband in a
deed or sale of the premises, her dower rights were not
barr·ed.
The principle is also recognized and applied in a
number of Federal cases. See In Re Lingafelter, 104 C.
C.A. 38, 181 Fed. 24, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 108; Wilson v.
Robins•on, et al. (C.C.A. 2, 1936), 83 F. (2d) 397, and
cas·es and authorities cited.
In the case at bar the effect of the decree of the
court and the effect of plaintiff's theory is substantially
the same as though plaintiff was a creditor seeking to
set aside the fraudulent conveyance. The plaintiff seeks
to obtain the benefits of the contract executed by R. W.
~fads·en. The Court in effect permits it to obtain those
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benefits and require~ the executor to assign l\J r. l\1 adsen's interest at the tiine of his death to the plaintiff.
Stated in another way, plaintiff says in effect: ''Before
:Mr. and .Mr~. j[adsen executed the Peterson contract
:Mrs. Madsen had an interest in the property. It is true
that that interest is subject to measurement and evaluation and it has a nwnetary value. To that interest we
have no clain1. After the Peterson contract, Mrs. Madsen has no interest because she had agreed to sell it to the
Petersons. Not only now do we claim the interest Mr.
Madsen had, but we also have a right to her inter,est."
This kind of logic is absolutely unsound and untenable. If l\Irs. l\Iadsen had an interest in the property
before she signed the Peterson contract, how can the
Court hold that all of the money under the contract
should go to the plaintiff and that she is entitled to receive no part of it, despite the fact that the Court holds
there is no obligation from her to the corporation to convey her interest to it 1
Since the plaintiff claims the interest of R. W.
Madsen.
Madsen and in effect claims his interest in the Peterson
contract, it is inconsistent for the Court to hold that jl rs.
Madsen "has no interest in and is not entitled to an
accounting for any ·of the money received by ~Iadsonia
Realty Company as paJinent for James 0. Peterson
and C. Amelia Peterson, his wife, or which shall hereafter be paid by said buyers, and LaReta C. Madsen is
not entitled to an accounting by Zion's Savings Bank
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& Trust Company, as executor of said estate, on account
of any moneys paid or owing by the purchasers of said
property.''

It is to be noted that the Petersons are not parties
to this lawsuit and are not bound by the decree. Nevertheless, they are certainly interested parties in the sense
that the findings of the Court may indicate to them to
whom the payments should be made in the future. The
Court went further than it needed to go in finding in
effect that Mrs. Madsen was to receive no part of the
Peterson paYJnent, but whether it unduly extended itself
or not, it is clear that the theory upon which the Court
made this decision was manifestly erroneous.
It is submitted that the Court should have found
in conformity with the proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law of the defendant LaReta C. Madsen
to the effect that she retains the property interest in this
land. (See R. 87, 88 ; Proposed Findings of Fa·ct Nos.
8, 9, 10 and 11, and proposed Conclusions of Law Nos.
2, 3, 5 and 5.)
(b) Even if LaReta C. Madsen agreed to convey
her dower rights to the Petersons, that fact does not
enlarge the rights of pba.intiff.

The point cannot be rnade too often that the decree
of the Court has the eff.ect of giving to the plaintiff
more rights than it had before the execution of the
Peterson contract. }fadsonia itself takes the position
that although it did not have the right to benefit from
a conveyance of ~Irs. :Madsen's inchoate dower interest
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before the execution of the Peterson contrac-t, it should
now ree.eiYe all of the benefits, and the Court found in
effect that the Petersons should pay all of the balance
due to the corporation.
Even asstuning for the purpose of argument only
that :Jirs. :Jiadsen joined with her husband in the Peterson contract as a fiduciary of the plaintiff corporation,
as it did under the Court's theory, the law is clear that
such joinder would not help the plaintiff. If an owner
of land deeds to A in a deed not joined by his wife, and
subsequently conveys to B, his wife joining, the wife's
release as to B is ineffective in an action by A to recover
the land. A 1nay recover but he does so subject to the
dower interest of the wife.
At Page 307 of V olun1e II, Scribner (on Dower)
states the law as follows :
"Release to Stranger. N.o Bar of Dower.
'' 40. It is well settled that it is no defense to
an action of dower, that the widow has released
her right to a stranger. In an early case in -:\[assachusetts in which the defense was that the defendant had ·executed a release to a third person,
the court said : 'The deed relied on to bar the
demandant shows no privity of estate, or connection of any kind between her and the tenant.
It cannot avail the t·enant in this action.' (Citing
Pixley v. Bennett, 11 :Mass. 298)
'' 41. In a case where lands had been mortgaged by the husband during coverture, his wife
not joining; and subsequently husband and wife
united in a conveyance of the equity ·of redemption to a third :person; and after breach of the
mortgage there was a foreclosure and sale; it
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was held, that the widow was entitled to dower
as against a purchaser under the decree not connecting himself in any manner with conveyance
of the equity. (Citing Littl·efield v. Crocker, 30
Maine 1926). So where husband and wife after
the recovery of a judgment against the husband,
and while it was a lien upon his lands, joined in
a conveyance containing full covenants of warranty and rel·ease of dower, and the grantee
entered and occupied under the deed but was
afterwards evicted by a purchaser at sheriff's
sale under the judgment, it was held that the latter
could not make the conveyance and release available for his protection against the claim of dower,
either as a grant, or as an estoppel. (Citing
Kitzmiller v. Van Rensselaer, 10 Ohio St. 63).
So where lands had been mortgaged to secure
the payment of a debt, both having joined in the
mortgage, subsequently the lands were sold under
a judgment against the husband, at the suit of a
stranger to the mortgage, it was determined that
as against the purchaser at such sale a wife was
not divested of her dower. (Citing Taylor v.
Fowler, 18 Ohio 567). The result will be the same
if the mortgagee proceed at law and sell the
mortgaged premises under ordinary judgment and
execution, instead of foreclosing his mortgage.
The purchaser under such a judgment cannot be
said to he in privity with the mortgagee and therefore is not protected against dower. (Citing Harrison v. Eldridge, 2 Haist. 392).
"Upon the same principle, if husband and
wife execute a deed of trust, and the lands are
afterward sold in satisfaction of a mechanics lien
subsisting at the date of the deed, the purchaser
takes the premises subject to dower. (Citing Gove
v. Cather, 23 III. 634)."
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Plaintiff cannot and does not deny that it claims no
privity with the Petersons. ~[adsonia n1akes no claim
whatsoever against the Petersons in this lawsuit; in fact,
its own E>vidence amply denwnstrated that Petersons
had a contract with ~[r. and Mrs. l\Jladsen and did not
know of any interest of the plaintiff in the land until
after R. \Y. ~Iadsen's death. The theory of the plaintiff's suit is that it should stand in the place of R. W.
~fadsen; in fact, as an alternative ground for relief
plaintiff prays "that the interest of Zion's Savings
Bank and Trust Company, as Executor of the Estate
of R. W. ~Iadsen, deceased, and the interest of LaReta
C. Madsen be declared to be subsequent and subordinate
to l\fadsonia Realty Company. :K• * * '' In other words,
plaintiff asserts the same right that a defrauded creditor
might assert if such a creditor elected to stand upon the
contract of sale and take its benefits. The Court agreed
with plaintiff and held that the plaintiff was entitled
to receive the interest of R. W. :Madsen. The point is
that the privity claimed by plaintiff is with R. vV.
Madsen and the right claimed is based upon an alleged
agreement to sell to plaintiff prior to the Peterson contract.
The foregoing discussion by Scribner, and the cases
which follow in this brief, therefore, are precisely in
point. In each case, as in the case at bar, the person
claiming that the wido'v released her dower is one who
asserts a right prior and senior to the instrument which
the wife. executed. The cases are uniform in holding
that the purported release is not effective, and that upon
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the estabtishm·ent of the prior right, the dower right is
restored.
In Pixley v. Bennett, 11 !fass. 298, a widow brought
writ of dower demanding that reasonable dower in
certain lands situate in the county concerned be awarded
to her. The defendant answered that the widow had for
a valuable consideration released and quitclaimed her
demand or account of dower to one Caleb and that this
release was an ineffectual bar to her claim for dower
in any of her husband's land. The defendant's theory
was that having once released her claim she was estopped. The Court held :
''The deed relied on to har the demandant
shows no privity of estate, or connection of any
kind between her and the tenant. It cannot avail
the tenant in this action. Littlefield v. Crocker,
30 Maine 192. Arin C. Littlefield, the husband
of the plaintiff, mortgaged certain land to one
Aurin; the wife of Littlefield did not join in this
deed. Subsequently, Littlefield and his wife joined
in a deed conveying the property to one Morrill.
The wife released her dower in the deed to Morrill. The mortgagee subsequently foredosed and
the present defendant is the assignee of the title
obtained through the sheriff's deed. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's release as to
Morrill barred her. The court held that defendant's contention was unsound, that no release
to Morrill affected defendant's title. Since the
defendant was not a privy or party to the plaintiff's conveyance, plaintiff was not estopped from
obtaining dower on land.''

Kitzmillerr v. V am Rensselaer, 10 Ohio St. 63, was an
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action to recover dower. The husband and the wife
owned the land at a time when one R got a judgment
against the husband. Mter the judgment was obtained
and while it was a lien, before any execution, the wife
joined ·with the husband in a deed containing a release
of dower to the defendant, X, "~ho went in possession.
Subsequently there was a judgment execution and X was
evicted by the title of the judgment holder. The court
held that the release of dower to X was not availing
for the defendant judgment creditor and that it was no
protection against the claim of dower either as a grant
and estoppel, or otherwise. The widow was assigned
dower in the land. This e-ase is clearly in point with
the case at bar.
The principle of these cases has been recognized
at least twice by the Utah Supreme Court. In the case
of Gee, et al. v. Bau.m, et al., 58 Utah 445, 199 P. 680,
a husband and wife executed a deed to the children and
grandchildren. The conflict in the evidence was as to
whether the husband delivered the deed. The court held
after reviewing the evidence that there was no delivery
and no intent to deliver and it was, therefore, necessary
for the court to decide whether the fact that the wife had
joined in signing this instrument, \Vhich was held not
to be effective as to the husband, was nevertheless a
waiver of her inchoate dower in the land. The court
said ( 452 Utah Reporter):
''The overwhelming weight of authority is to
the effect that if the wife joins in a deed with
her husband to release her dower right and the
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husband's deed is set aside for· any reason, then
the. wife has· the same rights in the land that were
attempted to be conveyed by the husband as
though the conveyance had not been made.''
The court quotes with approval Section 49 of Scribner on Dower hereinbefore quoted. The Court then
states:
''A moment's reflection will, we think, convince anyone that the foregoing doctrine is entirely sound * * * We are of the opinion, therefore, that when the deed of the husband in which
the wife joins, his wife merely is held inoperative
as against him, it .also becomes inoperative as
ag1ainst her, and that the grantee in such a deed
obtains no rights whatever as against the wife."
The second Utah case in which the principle was
expressly recognized was In Re Reynolds Est.ate, 62 P.
(2d) 270, 90 Utah 415. There it was held that the fact
that a wife joins in a mortgage does not release her
dowable interest as to heirs, personal creditors or taxes
in the estate. The only person who could take advantage
of the release was the mortgagee himself.
Plaintiff may contend that it does not seek to set
aside the Peterson contract. As to the Petersons that
is true. Certainly plaintiff does assert that it is entitled
to the ip.terest of R. W. Madsen in this contract. R. \V.
M·adsen's deal with the corporation was subject to the
inchoate dower· interest of his wife, and while the Court
does not· grant specific performance to the plaintiff
against Mrs. Madsen, the effect of its decision is to cut
out her interest, because in eff·ect it holds that the Peter-
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sons must continue to pay the su1ns due under the contract to the plaintiff, and that ~Irs. Madsen must convey
to the Petersons her interest by a deed when the terms
of the contract have been fully executed. Certainly this
holding operates to give to plaintiff more rights than it
had in any proper theory of the case.
The contention of the plaintiff has been determined
adversely to it. In the case of Froee v. Little, et al.
(1907), 31 Utah -1:49, 88 Pac. 407, the plaintiff alleged
that he had· had a contract as a buyer for the conveyance of certain real property by a man who was deceased
at the time the action was brought. The wife made no
agreement w convey her inchoate interest, and the purchaser knew that the seller was married at the time the
contract was entered into. The probate proceeding had
been completed at the time the action was brought but
the c(, urt held that the defendants' stood in the position
of th'= deceased's husband, and also because of the
peculi...r circumstances involved, in the position of the
wife. The principles announced were exactly the same
as th'- ugh the action was brought against the executor
and tl.e wife, as in the case at bar, for specific performance. This court expressly held that the action did not
lie. 1.. decided that specific performance could not have
he-en obtained against the wife. Therefore, after the
decea.;e of the husband the action could not be maintained against the executor of his estate or persons
standing in the shoes of the executor. The following
language is illuminating.
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''Could it be contended that, when the husband sold or conveyed lands without the consent
of his wife, and the wife had afterwards claimed
her interest and received it, the vendee of the
husband could claim specific performance of the
entire land against either the grantee or the donee·
of the wife~ Moreover, oould any one re1asonably
contend that such grantee could .not set up the
defense tha.t the husband simply attempted to
sell what he oould not sell, arnd that such grantee
or donee claimed from the trtrre owner of the fee,
the wife? Would not an exchange of property
stand in the same legal position~ These children,
therefore, in legal effect, simply effected an exchange with their mother, and we think they had
the legal right to interpose any defense to protect their title that the mother might have interposed, and could at least assert that the grantor,
their father, had no right or title either to sell
or convey. W·e think, therefore, that both upon
principle and reason the appellants had the right
to make the defense that they claimed in the right
of their mother, that the father could not sell or
convey her right without her consent, and that,
therefore, the respondent could not and did not
purchase the mothe·r's interest. While the authorities are not in harmony respecting the right
of. specific perf.ormance where the husband alone
agreed to sell or convey without the consent of
the wife, we think there is no subst:antial conflict
where, as· in this oase, it a!ppears that the p·u.rchaser ~at the time the contrract was ern;tered into
knew that the vendor W!as a ma.rried man, and
whe·re the.re is neither fraud, misrepresentation,
nor concealment.
"To enact a law giving the wife an interest
in the husband's real estaJte which he can neither
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barter, sell, or convey without her consent, would
be but an idle ceremony if the courts compelled
specific performance against either the wife or
those claiming under her or against the husband
if living. The purchaser buys with full knowledge
of both the interest as fixed by law and of his
vendor's legal status. The purchaser knows he
cannot obtain the interest of the wife without
her consent, and that such interest is contingent
only during the life of the husband, and that,
upon his death, it immediately vests in the wife
as a fee simple e·state. This court in the case
of Kelsy v. Crowther, 7 Utah, 519-522, 27 Pac.
695, recognizes the principle involved here, and
it is there held that specific performance will not
release her dower interest. Pomeroy, in his excellent work on Equity Jurisprudence (3d Ed.) vol.
7, Sec. 834 speaking upon this subject, says:' The
buyer's right to specific performance with compensation is subject to certain limittatiorvs; as,
when it conflicts u:ith the intervening rights of
third parties, an instan:ce of which i.s the case of
the right of the wife to be protected, in her dower
int.e;rest. Where the wife of the vendor refuses
to conveY her inchoate dower interest in the
land whi~h the vendor has contracted to sell,
equity, in 1nany jurisdictions, denies specific perfonnance with con1pensation against the vendor
for the deficiency, viz., the dower inte-rest, on the
ground that compulsion upon the husband would
tend to cause him to procure his wife's conveyance of dower against her will. For that reason
the buyer mu.st be satisfied to take less than he
conf.racted for by the amount of the dower interest,
or abandon the contract.' In a note to the case
Barbour v. Hickey, 24 L.R.A. 763, the cases upon
this point are collected. See, also, Pomeroy on
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ren, 18 N.J. Eq. 124, 90 Am. Dec. 613; Lucas v.
Scott, 41 Ohio St. 636; Graybill v. Brugh (Va.)
17 S.E. 558, 21 L.R.A. 133, 37 Am. St. Rep. 894.
We think the correct rule is well stated in the case
of Hawralty v. Warren, supra, where, at page
128, it is said: 'The court will not order a defendant to procure a conveyance or release by his
wife, or require him to furnish indemnity against
her right of dower, unless in cases of clear fraud.'
It is perfectly clear from the evidence in this
case that both respondent and her agent, her
husband, well knew that the deceased was a
married man; and hence, in view of the law of
this state, could· not affe0t the rights of his wife
by an attempted sale without her consent. There
is absolutely no fraud, no collusion, and no concealment in this case, and therefore no equity in
favor of the respondent as against the children
apart from the legal rights flowing from the contract itself, and this respondent is conclusively
presumed to have accepted burdened with the
provisions of law in respect thereto. In view of
the law ,as stated in the foregoing authorities,
it is quite cle~ar that a;n action for specific performance of the writing iw question 1against James
T. Little, if alive, could wat be enforced, and the
right to do so against the appeUants is certainly
no stronger in equity than U would be against
him." (Emphasis supplied).
The law in this State is therefore that plaintiff's
action cannot be maintained against the executor even
though a contract
proved and there are no other barriers to recovery. Certainly the Utah cases announce
the rule that the interests of Mrs. Madsen cannot be
taken from ·her, under the circumstanc-es of this case,
by Madsonia Realty Company.

is
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What equities does the plaintiff claim even as
against the interests of Mr. Madsen 1 A fortiori, what
equities can plaintiff claim against Mrs. :Madsen to
justify a dec.ree which effectively cuts her out of any
interest in this land f Certainly there is no justification
for :Jiadsonia 's position that it obtained rights as a
result of the Peterson contract, which it did not have
by reason of the alleged transaction between it and Mr.
:Madsen.
(c) The seller under an execu.tory contract of sale
of rea.l pr-operty retains a ''legal or equitable est,ate in
real property.'' Under our statute the wimow shares in
this interest.

It is immaterial whether at common law a seller's
interest in an executory real estate contract was dowable. A wife at common la'\v had no dower in an equitable interest. The requirements of the dowable estate
were seizin, an estate of freehold and, of course, the
death of the husband. Under Utah's distributive share
statute, however (Section 101-4-3, U.C.A. 1943), not only
does the widow obtain an interest in the "lands of freehold interest of which the husband dies seized,'' but
she obtains a one-third interest in all the legal and equitable estates in real property. The seller under an executory contract does not have seizen and he does not
have the entire fee interest but certainly he does have
an equitable interest in the land. He owns an interest in
real property.
In this very action plaintiff is granted a form of
relief peculiar to real property. It was granted specific
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perfonnance of a 1937 contract with R. W. :Madsen. It
asked in the alternative for a decree quieting title to the
land. If the seller under an executory contract for the
sale of land has no legal or ·equitable interest in the
land, the plaintiff cannot prevail against anybody on
any theo·ry in this case, because the only interests that
it can asser't to a claim are those which R. W. Madsen
possessed as such a seller.

We agree that R. W. Madsen had in interest in real
property at the time of his death and that if the plaintiff
satisfies the other requirements involved it n1ay maintain
its action for specific performance. This being true, the
Court erred in holding that Mrs. Madsen is not entitled
to receive t least a one-third interest in the balance due
under the contract at the time of R. W. Madsen's death.
Under any theory of the case this is the very least that
she is entitled to receive.
The seller in an executory land contract has an
interest that is sufficient to enable him to maintain an
action to quiet title or to remove a cloud on title. Kern
v. Ro:bertso'fl), 92 Mont. 283, 12 P. (2d) 565. He has an
interest that can be levied upon as real property, as is
shown by the following oases:
In Bauermeister v. McDonald, 245 N.W. 403, X
was the seller of land under an executory contract and
$12,000 remained to be paid at the time of his death.
In his will X devised certarn interests in the contract
to his sonY. Z was a judgment-creditor of Y who levied
an execution on ''all interest in the land'' that Y owned.
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A lower court enjoined the sale of Y's interest on the
theory that it was only equitable and not subj,ect to a
writ of execution. On appeal, the trial court was reversed. The court said that X held the legal title to the
real estate ''as security for the payment of the balance
of tl1e purchase price.'' The court said that unquestionably any judg1nent that might have been recovered
against X in his lifetime would have been a lien upon
the real estate to the extent of the unpaid purchase
price fron1 the buyer. The court cites the case of When
v. Fall, 55 Neb. 547, 76 N.W. 13, 70 Am. St. Rep. 397,
among other Nebraska cases, and quotes:

''A judgment in the district court against
a vendor of land who retains the legal title acts
as a lien to such land and as against a vendee in
pos·session with actual notice may be enforced
to the extent of the unpaid purchase price.
"Until the purchase price has been paid,
while the vendor holds the legal title subject to
an equitable obligation to convey to the purchaser on payment of the purchase money, he
has, unlike an ordinar)~ trustee, a personal and
substantial interest which he may actively assert,
or may transfer by written assignment." See
Tiffany on Real Property, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1, 8ec.
308.

These authorities are clear that a seller under a
title retaining contract does have a real property interest.
Tiffany on Real Property, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 308,
states:
''The statement that the vendor holds the
legal title in trust for the purchaser, is to be
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taken, it seems, with considerable reserve .
." 'That the contract is not. a trust and does
not create a fiduciary relation is the view taken
in the Restatement, Trusts, Sec. 13. That the
vendor is not properly referred to as_ a trustee
see article by Professor Samuel Williston, 9
Harv. Law Rev. at p. 117, quoting Rayner v.
Preston, 18 Ch. D. 1. See also 15 Colum. Law
Rev. at p. 256, 36 Sol. Jour. 775, 784; Bogert,
Trusts & Trustees, Sec. 18.' ( ftn. 22).
"He is trustee only to the extent of his obligation to perform the agreement between himself and the purchaser.
''A fiduciary relation does not exist between
them. Englestein v. Mintz, 345 Ill. 48, 177 N.E.
746.
'' 'All that is meant is that the vendee, because of the nature of the bargain, or the unpaid
vendor, because the right should be mutual, may
compel specific performance. Before performance is thus compelled, it is manifest that the
vendor holds the legal title subject to this equitable right of the vendee to compel a .conveyance,
and that there is also an as yet unexercised right
in the vendor to compel the vendee to accept and
pay for the property. Hence, until specific performance, the vendee is regarded as the equitable
owner, and the risk of loss is upon him; and the
vendor holds the legal title subject to the vendee's
equitable rights which are analogous to the rights
:O.f a cestui que trust only in that a conveyance
· may be compelled, and, possibly, in that the
vendee is entitled. to increment in value, rents
and profits, etc., if and when performance is had.
So also with the statement that a contracting
vendor of real estate holds the legal title' 'a8
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security for the payment of the purchase price.' '
This means, and was intended to Inean, no more
than that, while the vendee has a right to compel
specific performance, the vendor will not be required to convey unless and until the purchase
price be paid.' National Bank of Kentucky v.
Louisville Trust Co., 67 F. (2d) 97.'" (ftn. 23).
''Until the price has been paid, while the
vendor holds the legal title subject to an equitable
obligation to convey to the purchaser on payments of the purchase money, he has, unlike an
ordinary trustee, a personal and substantial interest, which he may actively assert, or may transfer
by written assignment. ''
'' 'Shaw v. Foster, L.R. 5 H.L. 321, per Lord
Cairns. See Pennsylvania Oo. for Insurance on
Lives and Granting .Annuities v. Philadelphia
Inquirer Co., 25 F. (2d) 701; Berndt v. Lusher,
40 Ohio .App. 172, 178 N.E. 14.' (ftn. 24).
'' 'Culmback v. Stevens, 158 Wash. 657, 291
Pac. 705, holding that such an assignment is good
a:s against the trustee in bankruptcy of the vendor
and he takes at most only the naked legal title
to the real property in trust for the assignee and
the vendees.' ( ftn. 25).
''Furthermore, a judgment against the vendor attaches as a lien on the land which may be
enforced, as against a purchaser in possession
with notice, to the extent of the unpaid purchase
price.'' See Bauermeister v. :.McDonald, supra.
In Utah, therefore, under our statute, when a husband and wife join in an executory sales contract, the
wife has a distributive share interest in the equity retained by the sellers, which she may assert against all
the world, subject only to the right of the buyer upon
his full performance.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42
'There is another line of cases deserving of the
Court's attention in considering the question of what
interests are dowable under an executory land contract.
The Utah case in point is McNeil v. McNeil, et al., 61
Ut. 141, 211 Pac. 988. There the husband was a buyer
in ·an executory land contract not performed completely,
and the widow claimed the statut'O·ry equivalent of dower
in this interest at his death. The court held that since
the contract was not completely performed, and equity
would not at that time compel a conveyance of the land,
the interest was not dowable. States in accord with this
rule are Alabama, Georgia, illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, South Carolina and
Tennessee. See 66 A.L.R., P. 67. If the wife of the buyer
under such a contract has no dower, the seller must
have a dowable interest; otherwise neither would get
any and the way would be opened for men to bar dower
on their wives simply by the use of a particular method
of effecting a transfer of real property. Certainly the
law would not sanction a device whereby two men could
place both of their interests beyond the dower statute.
''The title must vest somewhere; and since
the decedent did not divest hilnself of it by his
contract, it vested in those who were entitled
tmder the law to take by succession, viz., the
heirs.'' See Tyler v. Tyler, irvfra.
Moreover, it has been held that it is contrary to
the policy of the law to apply a technical doctrine to
defeat a wife's dower. In Tyler v. Tyler, 50 Mont. 65,
144 Pac. 1090, a husband and wife, for a consideration,
gave to certain buyers the exclusive right to purchase
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certain real estate in the form of an option. The deed,
executed by both, was placed in escrow. When the hus ..
band died before the purchaser exercised his right to
purchase and before the deed was delivered, the wife
claimed a share of the proceeds of the sale as dower.
Defendants, the other heirs, claimed that under the
''relation back" theory of escrow, the delivery to the
purchaser was effective as of the time of delivery to the
e~crow agent and no dower, therefore, could be awarded.
The court held that the widow was entitled to the relief
sought. It said:
"The rule contended for by defendants is a
fiction of law, applied by courts of equity in
exceptional cases to sustain a conveyance which
would otherwise fail of its purpose, and thus
defeat the intentions of the parties. (Citing illustrative cases). It has application to cases where
it is necessary to uphold a right. For example,
it might be invoked to uphold the title in Forbes
and Ector (the grantees) but it cannot be invoked
to defeat the right of the plaintiff which attached
before the second delivery.''
The court stated further that the widow was ''clearly entitled to her dower in the proceeds of the sale. * * *''
What is the difference in substance between the
facts of this case and the facts of the case at bar as far
as the interest of a ·seller in a land contract is concerned~ It is recognized, of course, that there is technical difference between an option contract and the
executory real estate contract in evidence in this ease,
but as a matter of substance and equity why should the
wife under an executory contract be held to have any
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less interest in the land it covers than if the same land
had been conveyed under an option agreement~ It is
submitted that particularly under our statutes the theory
of the Tyler .case is controlling in the case at bar, and
the Oourt should find that Mrs. Madsen retains an interest in the property.
We again emphasize to the Court that we do not
believe that any legal effect can be given to the signature
of Mrs. Madsen on the Peterson contract, since it is the
case of a wife joining with a third person and is therefore not effective to convey inchoate dower. However,
even if the Court finds that the Peterson oontract was
joined by her as the wife of Mtr. l.J!ladsen, it is nevertheless clBar upon principle anvd (l!Uthority that she re~ains ·a distribulive share interest in the land which the
plaintiff in this oa.se has no right to acquire.
(d) The execution of a cont'rlact to selllarnd does not
extinguish the seller's interest in1 .the Zand.

It is, of course, an elementary principle of law that
the seller not only has the legal title after the execution
of an executory real estate contract, but that he also is
the equitable owner of the land to the extent of the unpaid
balance on the contract. In other words, there is only
pro tonto conversion-only conversion to the extent
that the purchase price is paid by the buyer. I:Q the
case· at bar none ofthe money was paid to 1\irs. 1\Iadsen.
She received· no consideration from anyone. Why should
she now be"stripped of her right~
If A and B are tenants in cornmon of Blackacre
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and they execute a contract whereby they agree to convey to X by warranty deed upon the payn1ent of twelve
monthly installments in the amount of one hundred
dollars each, and X makes six monthly payments to A,
can it be said that without paying more X acquired
any right against B under his contract? Without question the law would require the payments to be made
to both A and B. On principle there is no reason why
a buyer should be permitted to ignore the fact that the
wife of the seller has an actual and subsisting, although
inchoate, interest in the land.
The dower interest has been zealously protected
by courts of law for nearly one thousand years. It is
a part of the genius of the Anglo-An1erican judicial ·
system It is designed to proteet wives against the
eventualities of the decease of their husbands and against
both co.J.spiring and unwitting trespass upon their marital rights. A buyer should not he permitted to assume
that a seller will account to his wife for her share in
the pruceeds of a contract any 1nore than he should he
permitted to assume that he will obtain her signature
on the deed without obtaining her signature on the contract. The payments should have been made to Mr. and
.Jfrs. :Madsen, as s·ellers, rather than simply to Mr.
Uadsen.
If one is constrained to feel sympathetic to'ward
the Petersons, it is well, nevertheless, to take a look
at the result as far as 1\irs. Madsen is concerned. She
is the vietim of a device which not only prevents her
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time, as she had every reason to anticipate, but under
the decree of the tdal court ·she is precluded from any
distributive interest either under the residuary clause
of the will or under the distributive share statute of the
estate with reference to real property.
It is submitted that the Court erred in finding and
concluding as a matter of law that Mrs. Madsen has no
present interest in the land.
POINT NO. IV
THE SILENCE OF R. W. MADSEN, SR., AND THE
PLAINTIFF, AND THEIR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE
ALLEGED INTEREST OF THE PLAINTIFF IN THE LAND
AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE PETERSON
CONTRACT, CONSTITUTED A FRAUD UPON MRS. MADSEN. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT
TO HER FOR ONE-THIRD OF THE TOTAL SALES PRICE,
AND SUCH RELIEF TO HER .SHOULD BE A CONDITION
TO ANY RELIEF TO PLAINTIFF IN THIS ACTION.

'The Court found that R. W. Madsen, Sr., sold the
property involved to the plaintiff on J;anuary 1, 1937,
for $10;680.00. After that time the property was carried
on the books of the corporation and recognized by Mr.
Madsen and the corporation as the property of the corporation. (Findings of Fact Nos. 5 and 6). On June
6, 1946, the Peterson contract was executed. The parties
to the contract were James 0. Peterson ~and C. Amelia
Peterson as buyers and Richard W. Madsen and LaReta
C. :Madsen, his wife, as sellers. Since the Court found
that l\ir. Madsen had conveyed his interest in the corporation in 1937, Mr. Madsen had no interest to convey
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at this tin1e, but the Court found ''That said Richard
\Y. Madsen was in fact acting for and on behalf of
Madsonia Realty Company in the signing of said contract of sale." (Finding of Fact No. 6). l\fadsonia
entered the sale on its books and Madsonia received all
of the payments between the initial payment and the
death of R. \V. Madsen. (Finding of Fact No. 6).
The Court found, ''That LaReta C. signed said
contract of June 6, 1946, vohmtarily as the wife of
Richard \Y. l\fadsen. That there were no misrepresentations made to LaReta C. l\fadsen by Richard W. Madsen
or any other person as an inducement to sign said contract." (Finding of Fact No. 7). The Court found that
~Irs. :Madsen signed the contract for the purpose of
releasing her statutory dower right, and that at no time
did either :\Ir. ~fadsen or the plaintiff, or any other
person, agree to give any portion of the purchase price
to :Jirs. Madsen. (Finding of Fact No. 7).
It is clear that :Jirs. 1fadsen knew nothing of the
alleged 1937 transaction between her husband and the
corporation, and it is not questioned, and cannot be,
that :Jirs. :Jiadsen did not know that the consideration
all went to the corporation instead of to her. The Court
found that ''neither at the time of the execution of the
Peterson contract on or about June 6, 1946, nor at any
time prior thereto, did defendant LaReta C. Madsen
know that lfadsonia Realty Company had or claimed
any right, title or interest in or to the aforesaid property;
that at no tin1e did either Richard \V. :Madsen personally,
nor did any other agent, officer or employee of Madsonia
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Realty Company, take any step whatsoever to put said
LaReta C. Madsen on notice of any claim or intere·st by
the said corporation." (Finding of Fact No. 10, R. 74)';
Mrs. Madsen testified that she never discussed the
Peterson contract with anyone other than R. W. Madsen;
that Mr. l\iadsen brought it to their home and she signed
it (R. 192). The record indicates that Mrs. Madsen
believed all of the money from the sale of the home at
667 East 4th South went into the joint bank account
that she and her husband had at the Utah State National
Bank (R. 202-203).
There can be no question, in view of the findings
of the Court, and as far as the record and facts are
concerned, that Mrs. Madsen did not know that neither
she nor her husband was to receive anything from the
Peterson contract but that everything was going to the
corporation. The failure to disclose these material facts
was fraudulent. The Court found in effect that I\lr.
Madsen was acting as a fiduciary of the corporation.
He wrus also acting in a position of trust and confidence
with reference to his wife. He did not disclose that he
was acting in behalf of the corporation. He did not
disclose that the consideration was not to go to him but
to the corporation. ~e failed to exercise the high degre·e
of good faith required of a husband towards his wife.
Since he was acting for the corporation and the corporation had knowledge of his wrongful conduct, and since
th'e corporation ,participated in the· trans·action, it is
charged with this fraud and must bear the consequences.
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The law is settled that remaining silent under circumstances creating an obligation to speak is as much
a fraud as actual misrepresentation.
''Fraud is the suppression of a fact by one
who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead
for want of communication of that fact ; the suggestion of a fact of that which is not true, by one
who does not believe it to be true; also a fraudulent misrepresentation by which one deceives
another to the injury of the latter.''
26 C.J.S. 34 and cases cited. See also 26
Corpus Juris, 1134 at Note 24, and see generally
Corpus Juris, Fraud, Sections 54, 93 and 95.
The law is stated by the editors of 37 C.J. Sec., p.
244, Sec. 16 of the discussion on Fraud, as follows :
''Where the particular circumstances impose
on a person a duty to speak and he deliberately
remains silent, his silence is equivalent to a false
representation.

!::

''An exception to the rule that mere silence
is not fraud exists where the circumstances impose
on a person a duty to speak and he deliberately
remains silent. It is well settled that the suppression of a material fact which a party is bound
in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false
representation. Where the law imposes a duty
on one party to disclose all material. facts known
to him and not known to the other, silence or concealment in violation of this duty with intent
to deceive will amount to fraud as being a deliberate suppression of the truth, and equivalent to the
assertion of a' falsehood. The concealment of a
fact which one is bound to disclose is an indirect
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representation that such fact does not exist, and
constitutes fraud. A similar rule has in some
jurisdictions been affirmed by express statutory
provisions. Whether a duty to speak exists in a
given cwse is a question depending on the peculiar
facts involved.

'' Misrepresenta~tions by third person. If one
stands silent in the presence of a third person
making misrepresentations which it is one's duty
to correct, such silence constitutes a fraud. * * *
''Where a relation of trust and confidence
obtains between the parties, there is a duty to
disclose all material facts, and failure to do so
constitutes fraud. * * *
"The rule applies, it has been said, wherever
confidence is actually reposed by one person to
the knowledge of the other.''
The kind of good faith and full disclosure required
by a husband in transactions with his wife are illustrated
by the case of Nissen v. Nissen Trampoline Co. (1949
Sup. Ct. of Iowa), 39 N.W. (2d) 92. There the plaintiff
and appellant was the wife of George P. Nissen during
the time in question. Part of the property involved was
owned in his own nam·e and part of it was owned by him
and his wife as joint tenants. The defendant and appellee, Nissen Trampoline Co., was a corporation and Mr.
Nissen o'Wlled all of its stock. He had been its president
since its organization and was acting as its president at
the time of the execution of the deeds in question. Plaintiff contended that on or about the 1st day of March,
1947, ·she signed certain blank instruments which were
presented to her by her husband, with his e~planation
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that they were papers in connection with the operation
of the corporation. He represented to her that the documents were papers which required her signature ·as an
officer of the corporation; in fact, the documents were
deeds which conveyed three separate properties to the
corporation.
The Court discussed in detail the evidence concerning
the circumstances at the time the deeds were signed,
and concluded that the trial court erred in failing to find
that the wife had been defrauded. The Court held that
the corporation was liable for the acts of the husband
since he \vas admittedly its agent, stating:
"The liability ·of a principal for the acts of
its agent growing out of the agent'·s knowledge
of certain facts as well as the liability of a principal under certain circumstances, including the
situation where the agent is the sole representative of the principal, is commented upon in 2 Am.
Jur. Agency, 300, par. 380, where it is stated:
'A qualification of the rule that the knowledge
of an agent engaged in an independent fraudulent
act on his own account is not the knowledge of
the principal has also been n1ade where the agent,
though engaged in perpetrating an independent
fraudulent act on his own account, is the sole
repre'Sentative of the principal. It is held under
such circumstances that the agent's knowledge
is imputable to his own principal, and that the
case falls within the general rule imputing the
agent's knowledge to the principal. This qualification to the exception has been applied in cases
involving agents and officers of corporations as
well as in cases involving agents and other principals.'
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''From a consideration of the many authorities we find. the rule to be that a person is bound
by the knowledge of his agent. This is predicated
on ·the theory that it is the agent's duty to disclose
all material facts coming to his knowledge with
respect to the subject matter of his agency, and
it is presumed that he has discharged that duty.
There is, however, an exception to this rule in
eases where the knowledge of the agent is obtained
while he is engaged in committing an independent
fraudulent act on his own part, the communication
of which to the principal would necessarily prevent its consummation. This exception or qualification is further qualified in the case of a fraudulent agent who is the sole representative of the
principal and under such circumstances the imputed knowledge of the principal applies. See
Annotations 48 A.L.R. 464, 468 and cases cited;
Annotations 86 A.L.R. 537 and Annotations 2
L.R.A. (N.S.) 994 and cases cited."
The Court held that the acts of the husband in relation to his wife in the obtaining of her stock were fraudulent in character and that the evidence was clear, satisfactory and convincing. The Court discussed the relationship between the husband and wife in the following
language:
"rrhe relationship between the appellant, the
wife and George P. Nissen, her husband, was
such as to create a confidential and fiduciary relationship. It has been our hold~ng that where a
fjduciary or confidential reladon is sho,vn to exist
'between the parties to a' transaction the burden
is upon 'the one claiming a benefit. therefrom to
establish entire fairness on the part of the party
benefitted. First National· Bank v. Ten Na pel,
198 Iowa 816, 819, 200 N.W. 405. ·There can be
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no doubt in this pre·sent case as to the confidential
relationship between the appellant and George P.
Nis·sen. It is true there was no confidential relationship between the appellant and the corporation but the fact that Nissen was the sole representative of the corporation in the transfer of
the properties while acting in a confidential relationship to his wife can and should be taken into
consideration in our determination of this case.''
It is settled law that a husband cannot so conduct
his affairs that his wife is misled into a release of her
dower right interest by fraudulent misrepresentations.
In K ratli v. Booth, et a.l., 191 N.E. 180, 99 Ind. App.
178, a husband by fraudulent representations induced
his wife to execute a deed to certain real property to a
nominal trustee without consideration. After the husband's death the trustee conveyed the land to the children and grandchildren of the husband. The Court found
that the widow wa:s not divested of her interest because
of the fraud practiced upon her in the inception and
execution of the deed, and that the children and grandchildren, having knowledge of the fraud, were not in a
position to object to the allotment of her dower. The
Court said:
"Husband and wife occupy a relation of special trust and confidence toward each other, and
owe, one to the other, the utmost good faith.
Whenever the confidence resulting from such a
relationship is abused, equity will intervene to
right the wrong." (Citing cases, see Page 182,
Northeast Reporter.)
Further said the Court:
''As between husband and wife, the husband,
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in the absence o.f facts showing otherwi•se, is presumed to exercise a superior dominating influence
over the wife in ·business affairs to such an extent
that she depends upon and suffers her conduct
to be eon trolled by his wish and judgment."
The Court said that the husband induced the wife
to join in the execution of the deed to the trustee with
a promi•se that it would be sold and the proceeds invested. The husband's purpose was to have the bank
convey the land to his children and grandchildren ana
to defeat the wife's rights as his wife or surviving
widow.
''He did not exercise that high degree of
honor and good faith toward his wife, and make
a complete disclosure of all the facts surrounding
the conveyance which the law demands from a
husband when dealing with her in matters affecting her property and marital rights. 'He owed
to her the utmost good faith and frankness.'
These important duties he failed to fulfill. He
concealed from appellant the important fact that
he had an oral agreement with the bank to ·convey
the land to appellee. He did not intend at that
time to carry out the promise which he made to
appellant to induce her to sign the deed. 'A
present state of mind is a present state of fact.
It was a fraud upon appellant to conceal from
her his intention to have the real estate conveyed
to his children and grandchildren. Basye v. Basye,
supra.
"It has been held in this state that when one
person designedly and knowingly causes a false
impression or belief to be entertained by another,
and the latter is thereby induced to make a contract injurious to his interests, such a contract
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is so impressed "''ith fraud that the courts will
set the ·sa1ne aside.' Kemery v. Zeigler ( 1912) 176
Ind. 660, 96 N.E. 950, 95±; Sherrin v. Flinn (1900)
155 Ind. 422, 58 N.E. 5-!9; see "\Vestphal v. Heckman, supra.
•'Equity regards the substance of a transaction and not the forn1. This conveyance was made
to a nominal tn1stee without consideration, it
never accepted or had the management or control
of the property, and after the death of John G.
Kratli pursuant to his oral instructions, without
consideration and at their request, conveyed the
property to the appellees. They were not innocent purchasers for value and received the real
estate burdened with any rights which the appellant had therein as surviving widow of her deceased husband.
''Facts not found in a special finding, as to
such omitted facts, amount to a finding against
the party having the burden of proof. The burden was upon the appellees in this case to establish the fact that when John G. Kratli induced
appellant to sign and acknowledge the deed to
the bank, he acted in perfect good faith, that he
took no advantage of his influence or knowledge,
and that the contract wa·s fair, adequate, and
equitable. ~fcCord v. Bright, supra. The special
finding of facts fails to show that appellees have
discharged this burden. vV e hold therefore that
on the special finding of facts and the presumptions of law that prevail in cases of this character, the execution of the deed from John G.
Kratli and appellant to the bank was, as to her,
procured by fraud practiced upon her by her
husband, and was therefore void and not binding
upon her, and that •she is entitled to have her
title quieted in a life estate in an undivided one
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third of the lands of her deceased husband, as
against the appellees.''
The Court's attention is invited 'to the remarkable
similarities in the case at bar. Here, Mr. Madsen conveyed to the corporation without hi.s wife's knowledge.
Then, without disclos,ing the interest of the corporation,
and without drsclo'Sing the fact that he was receiving no
consideration, and without disclosing the facts of the
case, and while acting, according to the theory of plaintiff and the trial court, as trustee and agent of the plaintiff, he presented to his wife a contract which he said was
to convey ''our home''. The corporation had knowledge
of the real facts and knew that Mrs. Madsen had no
knowledge of them. It participated in the transaction.
Mr. Madsen then claimed that the stock in t'he corporation was held by his two 'Sons, or in the will admitted
to probate he left all of the stock in the corporation to
them. The result of the transaction was to exclude his
wife's interest and to prevent her from receiving any
benefits under the contraCJt which she was fraudulently
induced to sign. Certainly a court of equity should scrutinize closely the entire transaction and should prevent
the plaintiff from being enriched by its own fraudulent
conduct.
In connectiop_ with the goo<;! faith required of a husband toward hi'S wife in transaetions concerning property in' which·. she has an inchoate. dower interest, the
attention of .the Court is invited to Stokes v. Stokes
. (1922), 196 N.Y. Sup. 184, 119 N.Y. Misc. 1'68. In that
case the wife·. brought an action alleging ( 1) that two
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deeds were executed without consideration; (2) that their
exec.ution was obtained by fraud, coercion, suppression
of facts and undue influence; (3) that the wife may not
release her inchoate dower to her husband, and (4) that
the procuring of her signature on the deeds in question
wa:s for the purpose of defrauding her in obtaining the
release of her inchoate dower right in the property.
The husband claimed that there was an antenuptial
agreement but he could not produce it, and the Court
doubted its existence. The deeds in question were signed
three months after the marriage of the parties, when
the husband came to the wife's bedroom and asked her
to sign them. The grantee was a corporation in which
the husband owned all of the sto'Ck. The husband did
not record the deeds until eight years later, when difficulty arose between the parties. The Court said that
it was an elementary principle that a wife could not
release her inchoarte dower as to her husband.
''May she, by joining in a deed to a corporation, the stock of which is entirely owned by her
husband, release that dower right 1 The corporation is ordinarily to be considered a separate
entity, but when I consider all the circumstances
before me-the claim of an antenuptial agreement and the evidence introduced to sustain that
claim ; the non-production of the agreement; the
withholding of the deed to the corporation by
defendant Stokes for over eight years; his possession of it during all of that time; the facts
attendant upon the execution of the deeds a:s evidenced bv the oral and documentary evidence~!
do not b~lieve a court of equity should be estopped by a mere legal fiction of 'entity'."
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The Court .said that it would not permit a mere
device or contrivance to be used to do away with her
inchoate right, and quoted Hayes v .. Hemry, 1 Md. Ch.
337, as follows :
''One of the badges of· fraud in such case is
the relation of the possession of the property
by the husband after the transfer of the title,
or keeping the deed in his hands after its execution.''
The Court dis'cussed the superior knowledge of the
husband, and the fact that he was a dominant party,
and concluded that she was misled into not scrutinizing
the instruments because of her trust in her husband's
good faith. The relief prayed for by the wife was
granted.
Can there be any doubt that the fact that the consideration in the Peterson contract was intended to go
and did go to the corporation was a material fact, the
suppression of which constitutes fraud~ Mrs. :Madsen
had a legal relationship toward her husband; she shared
in a joint bank account with him; she had an interest
as his wife in his property; she expected that he was
going to get the money under the Peterson contract.
She had no legal relationship to the corporation, as to
which she was legally a total stranger. It is an empty
answer to say that she would have signed even if she
had known of the facts; The -case is to be decided on the
facts as they occurred and not upon some speculation
as to what 1night have been the result of different facts .
. It is submitted that the Court erred in failing to
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conclude that the acts of t·he plaintiff and Mr. Mads·en
constituted a fraud upon ~Irs. :Madsen, and that she
should receive an accounting frmn the corporation of
one-third of the amounts received by it under the Peterson contract, and that she should further be awarded
an a1nount equal to on-e-third of the present value of the
contract, including interest. Less than this relief permits
the corporation to profit by its fraud. As framed, the
decree is inequitable, unrealistic and contrary to la.w.
CONCLUSION
If the Court agrees with appellants that the action
of the plaintiff is barred either by. the statute of frauds
or the statute of limitations, then the Court must still
detennine whether !irs. :Jladsen was defrauded and
whether the plaintiff must account to her for one-third
of the moneys it has already received on the Peterson
contract. If the Court agrees with Point No. III of
appellants and finds that ~Irs. :Jiadsen still has a onethird interest in the property, then the Court will not
be required to pass upon the problem raised by Point
IY of the argument, because l\Irs. :Madsen will still have
the rights which the Court found she had released to
the Petersons. At least with reference to the n10ney still
to be paid under the contract, Points III and IV of the
argument are alternative positions and should be considered as such.

In any event, it is clear beyond question that the
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est whatsoever in both the land or the sales price under
the contract.

Respectfully submitted,

McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN
AND

RICHARDS,

Attotrneys ~o~r Appellamts.
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